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INDONESIAIN 1985
Chills and Thaws

Donald E. Weatherbee
On August 17, 1985, Indonesia celebrated the 40th anniversary of its proclamation of independence from the Dutch. The four
decades are almost evenly divided by the political discontinuity of gestapo,
the aborted leftist coup of October 1, 1965, which ushered in President
Suharto's "New Order" and the politicial dominance of the Indonesian
Armed Forces. The "New Order's" ambivalence toward its historical origins was still apparent in 1985 in the contrasting rehabilitation of the public image of President Sukarno and the execution, after years of
imprisonment, of four sexagenarian Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
leaders.
From the vantage point of twenty years, let alone forty, Indonesia seems
to have a lot to celebrate. Compared with the turmoil, negative development, and increasing international isolation marking the late Sukarno
years, Indonesia today enjoys a reasonable degree of relative political stability and economic progess and is emerging as a major regional and
nonaligned international actor. Nevertheless, President Suharto warned
his countrymen in his August 17th national day message "to be on guard
against all kinds of threats, disturbances, and other sources of unrest."
This is in the context of the generational transfer of power to a younger
generation from those who first led the nation to freedom in the struggle
against the Dutch and who later, in their estimation, saved the revolution
from the PKI. In 1985, the government continued its efforts to consolidate the institutions of the "New Order" to ensure that regime continuity
would be maintained even as individual role-holders changed.
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Domestic Politics
By the time the next general elections take place in 1987, followed by the
1988 indirect presidential election, the generational transfer will be nearly
accomplished. One of the major thrusts of President Suharto's current
term, now at midpoint, has been to entrench the formal structures of a
Pancasila society. In a country that is statistically 90% Muslim, the Pancasila state is essentially secular, being based on the "Five Principles" of
the Indonesian state. Ideological or particularistic dissent and division
over the ends and means of politics is to be contained in the interests of
development, and political competition is to give way to social harmony.
This is to be accomplished statutorily through the passage of a package of
five bills designed to set the "New Order" in constitutional concrete.
In February 1985, the political parties bill was passed requiring that all
political parties espouse only the state ideology as their principle. Resisted
most strongly by Muslim politicians grouped under the umbrella United
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the new law
effectively secularizes party competition through stipulating that parties
can differ only in their programs, not in their principles. The regime continues to deny that the adoption of Pancasila as the sole principle for political parties means that the country is moving toward a single-party system.
Certainly the impact is such that the PPP and Indonesian Democratic
Party (PDI), the other nongovernmental faction, are no longer vehicles for
opposition in a competitive party system, but are to serve, as in a singleparty system, and despite their residual identities, as mobilizers of support
for government policy. The largest of the PPP's constituent parties, the
Nahadatul Ulama (NU), has withdrawn from active politics and announced that it will be "neutral" in the next elections in so far as the
voting preferences of its individual members are concerned.
Already Golkar, the government's non-party party and chief mobilizer
of electoral support, is gearing up for the 1987 legislative elections. It currently holds 246 of the 364 elective seats in the Peoples Representative
Assembly (DPR). The next parliament will have 500 seats: 400 elected
and 100 reserved for the military. Golkar aims to win at least 280 of the
contested seats to maintain its relative position. This means taking about
67.7% of an estimated 90.68 million votes, or to use Golkar's precise
figures (two years in advance), 61,391,869 votes. While the PPP and PDI
have fallen into internal disarray and internecine squabbling, Golkar has
pushed forward with its ambitious program of organization down to the
village level. At the end of Golkar's October party congress, party chairman Lt. Gen. Sudharmono reported that membership numbered 10 million, of whom 6.5 million had been given cadre training. The growth and
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penetration of Golkar raises the interesting question as to whether it could
provide an alternative or rival to the army as a constituent base for future
aspiring presidential candidates.
It was not until June that the controversial Bill on Mass Organizations
was passed. The other four bills were drawn to keep party politics confined within the Pancasila. The Bill on Mass Organizations extended the
Pancasila system to all associational aspects of Indonesian society. All private voluntary social groupings must adopt the Pancasila as their sole
guiding principle. If any group is deemed to have deviated from the Pancasila, the government has broad powers of intervention and dissolution.
Muslim opponents of the law saw in it the imposition of a civil religion
over Islamic organizations.
It was Islamic opposition to the Bill on Mass Organizations that had
earlier sparked violent opposition such as the September 1984 Tanjung
Priok riot. This spilled over into 1985. The country and world were
shocked in January by bombings of Buddhist images at the Borobudur,
linked to the commencement of the trials of those arrested in connection
with the Tanjung Priok riots. Only a week after the Borobudur outrage,
another national monument, the palace (kraton) of the Susuhunan of Solo,
was leveled by fire. Sporadic bombings and incendiary attacks occurred
throughout Indonesia creating a general sense of unease. In early July a
fire destroyed the Metro shopping center in Jakarta's Chinatown. Two
weeks later a major blaze gutted the headquartersof Radio Republik Indonesia. Twenty days after that 60 buildings in a Jakartacommercial district
were engulfed in flames. The government actively discouraged speculation
that these fires could have been politically motivated.
Suharto was resolute, vowing that the government would never bow to
terrorismand violence. Its reaction to both the verbal and physical assault
on the Pancasila society has been a crackdown on dissidents of whatever
persuasion. Three series of trials in particular demonstrated the government's firm intention both to punish and to warn off "subversive"opposition. In the wake of the Tanjung Priok riots some 30 defendants were
jailed for one to three years. Ten people were tried for the Bank Central
Asia bombings, which were in retaliation for the Tanjung Priok killings
and which had anti-Chinese overtones. Tasrif Tuasikal, an Islamic teacher
and alleged "mastermind"of the plot, was given a life sentence. Former
Minister of Industries Haji Mohamad Sanusi was convicted of conspiring
in the plot and providing funds. He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment. Other sentences ranged from 9 to 19 years. Other trials of radical
Islamic teachers have been held around the country.
The centerpiece of the legal assault on opposition was the beginning of
the trials of prominent Islamic and retired military figures for alleged links
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to the Bank Central Asia bombing conspiracy and subversion. In addition
to well-known Muslim spokesmen such as Tony Ardie, Marwardi Noor,
and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, members of the "Petition of 50" group have
also been called to the dock-first A. M. Fatwa and then, dramatically, Lt.
Gen. (Ret.) Hartono Dharsono. Some members of the "Petition of 50"
group, known from their 1980 "Statement of Concern," shortly after the
Tanjung Priok riots drafted a White Paper censuring excessive use of force
by the military and calling for an independent investigation of the affair.
The part of the White Paper that, in the words of the government's indictment of Dharsono, spreads "the sense of enmity, disorder and unrest
among the public at large," was the suggestion that the Tanjung Priok
affairwas caused by public discontent over government policy, particularly
the imposition of the Pancasila as the sole guiding principle. The decision
to put former Siliwangi Division commander and ASEAN Secretary-General Dharsono on trial is clearly meant as a chilling deterrent, showing
that the governmentbrooks no opposition no matter how distinguished the
quarter. Other "Petition of 50" figures expected to be tried are Ali
Sadikan, one time governor of Jakarta; Hoegang Iman Santoso, former
national police chief; Slamat Bratanata, former minister of mines trials;
and Andi Aziz, former minister of people's industries.
The uncompromising commitment of the regime to its vision of the Pancasila state can be partially attributed to an inherent antipathy to Muslim
political demands. It can be further explained in terms of the political
delicacy of this period of transition in Indonesia and the government's intention to take no risks as it moves toward the next elections. The government's equation of "extremism of the left" and "extremism of the right"
was probably partly responsiblefor 1985's mini-Red scare, which saw public alarm over the alleged infiltrationof Indonesia by the clandestine return
of PKI exiles.

The Economy
The year 1985 was another year that saw the macroeconomic management
of the economy continue to moderate the impact of lower oil prices. Oil
and gas still account for 70% of Indonesia's export earnings. GDP growth
in 1984 was 6.5% with inflation kept under 4%. The 1984/85 current
account deficit was halved to under $2 billion. At the end of April, foreign
exchange reserves totaled $10.5 billion as compared with the $6.3 billion
on hand when the rupiah was devalued in March 1983. In June 1985, the
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia approved new soft credits and
grants of $2.4 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1986, the same
level as the previous year. According to the World Bank, Indonesia has
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been "very prudent" in its overall management of its international debt
which at the end of 1984 was estimated at $24.6 billion. The debate on
industrialization strategy in Indonesia continued in 1985, fueled by the
World Bank's call for "an early rationalization of industrial and trade policy" by eliminating "implicit subsidies" to inefficient and high-cost domestic industries. These industries are often, however, the best-connected
politically.
Too much of a good thing continues to flood Bulog, the National Logistics Bureau, with a huge surplus of rice. Only five years ago Indonesia was
still a rice deficit country, but it now has had three bumper years in a row.
The 1984 harvest was 25.5 million tons with Bulog stockpiling 2.7 million
tons. The 1985 harvest is estimated at 26.3 million tons with Bulog stocks
rising to 3.5 million tons. Another million or more tons are privately
stored. Indonesia stared exporting rice in 1984 with 100,000 tons going to
the Philippines and 169,000 tons to Africa. Because the internal pricing
mechanism puts the cost of Bulog's stock well above world rice prices,
exports would in fact have to be subsidized.
In an effort to sharpen the competitiveness of Indonesia's non-oil exports, an aggressive campaign was launched in 1985 to reform Indonesian
ports. Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 4 swept away in April the notoriously corrupt and inefficient Indonesian Customs Service and turned the
task of clearance over to the Swiss Societe General de Surveillance. Bureaucratic and administrative reforms are expected to cut harbor costs by
half. That the government is resolved to achieve the goals of Inpres 4
seems indicated by the fact that Armed Forces Commander General
Benny Murdani was placed in charge of the cleanup. Within two months
dramatic changes were evident, with administrative hurdles at Tanjung
Priok, Indonesia's main port, being reduced from 52 to 3, and goods time
on and off the docks cut from 15 days to 2. Inpres 4 shows again that
when convinced of a sense of economic urgency, Indonesia's leaders can
act decisively in the face of vested bureaucratic and political interests. Inpres 4 is cut from the same pragmatic cloth as the bold austerity measures
of 1983.

Foreign Policy
The year 1985 was the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, which signalled Indonesia's emergence on the world stage. To
mark the occasion, and to announce in a sense its own reemergence on the
world stage, Indonesia hosted in April a commemorative gathering of 80
nations to reaffirm the relevance of the Bandung Principles. Although
short on real substance, given the requirements of fashioning a document
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acceptable to all, the conference projected Indonesia as a major leader in
the nonaligned movement, providing Jakarta with an extra-ASEAN platform to assert its new self-confidence and claim to proper international
standing. To some extent this was at ASEAN's expense, since Indonesia
gave way to India on the issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan. The Indonesian-drafted declaration referred indirectly to "conflicts in Southeast
Asia and Southwest Asia."
In October 1985, at the Rome Food and Agriculture Organization meeting, President Suharto was the spokesman of the "South" to Franqois Mitterand's "North." Suharto also undertook an East European tour, which
was also seen as validating Indonesia's nonaligned credentials. Quiet lobbying tried to present Indonesia as an alternative compromise candidate to
lead the nonaligned movement for the 1986-89 period. No compromise
was necessary, however, since the September 1985 Luanda Nonaligned
Foreign Minister's Meeting selected Zimbabwe as the venue for the 1987
summit.
One aspect of Indonesia's nonaligned diplomacy has been its continuing
efforts to persuade the more politically radical African states to accept the
irreversibilityof Indonesia's sovereignty in East Timor. Although the issue of Timor has faded after ten years, it still refuses to go away. At the
Luanda meeting, host country Angola controlled the agenda and despite
strong Indonesian objections included the question of East Timor in its
draft of the political resolutions. After bitter debate, the reference to East
Timor was dropped. The question of East Timor was also, for the third
year in a row, excluded from the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly.
Even more satisfying for Indonesia was Australian Prime Minister
Hawke's recognition of Indonesia's de facto sovereignty in East Timor and
the closing down of Fretilin's radio link to Australia.
Relations also improved with Papua New Guinea as the PNG government began a more active policy designed to discourage and obstruct OPM
insurgents among the thousands of Irian Jaya refugees from using PNG as
a sanctuary for attacks on the Indonesian side of the border. Port
Moresby's new approach also led to the forced repatriation of 12 Irian
Jayans after they served prison terms in PNG for firearms offenses. The
deportations sparked an Irian Jayanese riot in the border town of Vanimo
near the Blackwater refugee camp. It was at this camp a year earlier that
an Indonesian official mission had been attacked by OPM supporters.
It is in relations with the PRC that perhaps the greatest alteration in
Indonesian foreign relations occurred in 1985. Indonesia's diplomatic relations with the PRC were suspended in the aftermath of gestapo in which
Indonesian leadership suspected a Chinese hand. Despite sporadic civilian-based calls for normalization of relations with China, Indonesia con-
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tinues to insist on an explicit disavowal of support by Beijing for
communist movements and parties in Southeast Asia. There is a broader
strategic background in which Indonesian security managers view the
PRC as a long-range threat.
There had been some speculation that the attendance of Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian at the Bandung session-Indonesia's first official Chinese visitor in 18 years-might presage some political
breakthrough. An anticipated private meeting between Wu and Suharto
did not take place, either because of poor scheduling or as a diplomatic
snub. The talks between Wu and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar
did result in the finalization of plans to resume direct Indonesian-Chinese
trade, cut off since 1967. By 1984 indirect trade, mainly through Hong
Kong and Singapore middlemen, had reached the modest level of $242.9
million a year. In July 1985 a nongovernmental agreement was signed in
Singapore between the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(KADIN) and the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT) providing for direct trade between the two countries. This
was followed by an exchange of KADIN and CCPIT trade missions to
explore areas of mutual advantage. The Indonesian delegation returned at
the end of July with what it claimed were commitments by the Chinese to
purchase more than $200 million of Indonesian goods, which would redress the deficit Indonesia had been running in indirect trade. Indonesian
officials went out of their way to deny that the resumption of direct trade
relations with the PRC was the first step toward normalization of diplomatic relations.
It is probablycorrect, in fact, to put the change in PRC trade policy in a
commercial as opposed to political setting. It fits fully within Jakarta's
aggressive efforts to broaden its non-oil exports and also to open nontraditional markets. The new direct trade ties to the PRC balance the effort
made in 1984 to obtain greater economic access to the Soviet Union and
East Europe. The Soviet opening was followed in October 1985 by the
official visit to Indonesia of USSR Deputy Prime Minister Ryabov, the
highest-level Soviet visit since 1965. In part Indonesia's "ostpolitik" reflects increased concern in Jakarta, as elsewhere in ASEAN, with what is
perceived as creeping to galloping protectionism in the Japanese and Western industrial countries. High on Indonesia's bilateral agenda with the
United States, for example, was its vigorous opposition to the terms of the
Jenkins bill, which, as originally drafted, would have severely impacted on
Indonesia's textile exports.
Indonesia continued in 1985 to pursue its "dual track" diplomacy toward Vietnam, one track being its own bilateral relationship with Hanoi,
the other its adherence to ASEAN's policies on Cambodia. The "dual
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track" diplomacy is itself dual-tracked in the sense of an official Indonesian policy toward Vietnam as represented through the Foreign Ministry
and a military policy toward Vietnam as pursued by General Benny
Murdani. While perhaps complementary in the Indonesian-Vietnamese
track, the military link does complicate Indonesia's relations with Thailand, ASEAN's front-line state.
Foreign Minister Mochtar traveled to Hanoi in March 1985 and his
Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach paid a reciprocal visit to
Jakarta in August. The August visit in particular was invested with great
significance by Vietnam. If followed the 11th Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Meeting at which Vietnam announced its intention to withdraw its
forces totally from Cambodia by 1990. Giving greater weight to Indonesia's role as ASEAN "interlocutor" than perhaps is warranted, Vietnam
tried to place the August Mochtar-Thach meeting in the framework of a
Vietnam-ASEAN negotiation. This is viewed from Bangkok and Beijing
as an effort to drive a wedge between Indonesia and Thailand since the
flexibility of the bilateral agenda allows positions previously rejected by
ASEAN to resurface as Indonesian proposals. For example, in the August
meeting Mochtar raised as a point the establishment of a demilitarized
neutral zone on the Thai-Cambodia border, which when suggested by the
Indochinese side three years earlier had been rejected by ASEAN as an
effort to reduce the dispute to a Thai-Cambodia border question rather
than a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Symbolically, at least, Foreign
Minister Thach appeared pleased at the outcome, noting that "the progress was very encouraging." A month later at the U.N. General Assembly, Vietnam's Vo Dong Giang, with reference to the Indonesian dialogue,
claimed that conditions for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem were "steadily ripening." The presumption seems to be that there will
be a follow-up. In October 1985, an Indonesian trade delegation visited
Vietnam. Later the same month a delegation from Indonesia's National
Defense Institute paid an official visit. In November, senior editors from
the Indonesian Journalists' Associaiton followed the path to Hanoi.
Contributing to the atmosphere of the Indonesian-Vietnamese relationship was the April 1985 visit to Indonesia by Vietnamese Defense Minister
General Van Tien Dung, reciprocating General Murdani's visit to Vietnam a year previously. Again in his public comments Murdani stirred
ASEAN. He accepted that the announced Vietnamese troop withdrawals
from Cambodia were genuine, not merely disguised troop rotations, as
ASEAN holds. This was particularly galling to Bangkok since it came in
the wake of the most punishing Vietnamese dry-season offensive ever. Reiterating his view that Vietnam does not represent a threat to Southeast
Asia, Murdani hailed Dung's visit as opening up "fine long-term prospects
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for the advancement of multi-faceted relations between our two countries
and armed forces." The Indonesian armed forces relationship is not limited institutionally to Vietnam's armed forces. While in Indonesia,
Nguyen Co Thach made a publicly unscheduled flying vist to Murdani in
Bali.
As part of his Vietnam diplomacy, Foreign Minister Mochtar also intervened between the United States and Vietnam on the issue of the MIAs.
Coming out of his March 1985 visit to Hanoi, Mochtar proposed that the
U.S. and Vietnam should take steps toward normalization of relations.
This, in his opinion, would facilitate an environment in which the
Cambodian crisis could be resolved. The first step in the process, as suggested by Mochtar, would be the establishment of a U.S. interest section in
Hanoi and a speedy resolution of the MIA question. This would be synchronized with a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Whether at Indonesian instigation or not, certainly late 1985 saw a
much more forthcoming Vietnamese position on the MIA question. It is
Indonesia's belief that U.S.-Vietnamese normalization must be part of a
comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia that leads Jakarta to continue to view negatively the prospect of U.S. military assistance to the
Khmer resistance, even though for the sake of solidarity it joined the February 1985 ASEAN appeal.
Indonesia's higher-profile foreign policy and its meanderings from the
ASEAN straight and narrow on Cambodia have caused questions to be
raised as to the depth of Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN. Has Indonesia "outgrown" ASEAN as it seeks a leadership role consonant with its
relative power and new-found political confidence? In Michael Leifer's
words: "There is a growing willingness in Jakartato think aloud about the
unthinkable because ASEAN is seen to be holding Indonesia back."1 But
because some elements of the Jakarta foreign policy elite are worriedly
frustrated over Cambodia does not mean that they would lightly abandon
the structure of regional cooperation that has served them so well in so
many ways. The real problem is the degree to which ASEAN will be perceived in Jakarta as being strategically penetrated by extra-regional interest in competition with the working out of Indonesian national interest in
the ASEAN setting.

1. Michael Leifer, "Indonesia in ASEAN-Fed
Economic Review, October 3, 1985, p. 26.

up being led by the nose," Far Eastern

